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Abstract 
There is no gainsaying the fact that, 22 years after the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union, Russia is still counting on the losses of that 
historical development. Apart from losing its position as a regional 
power, especially among the former union republics of the former 
USSR, Russia is yet to come to terms with losing Crimea, which it 
considers as the first great price wrestled from the Ottoman Empire, a 
mark to Russia’s rise to great-power status, and a warm-water port 
with direct access to the Mediterranean and thus, the wider world; and 
also Sevastopol, the Crimean port city where Russian Black Sea fleet 
docks. No wonder, Russia had already started celebrating the 
annexation of Crimea, thus escalating crisis in that region. A lot has 
been written about this crisis but a little, if at all, has been said about 
the ethno-linguistic dimension of the crisis, hence, this piece. An 
effort is made in this paper to critically analyze the historical 
background of Ukrainian and Russian languages in Ukraine and the  
state of Ukrainian language in the Soviet era. Also analyzed is the new 
language law in Ukraine and how all these contribute to the present  
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Ukrainian crisis. The work concludes that Ukraine is a bilingual 
country and that the government of the country will do well to 
maintain the status quo. 
 
Keywords: Ukraine; Russia; ethno-linguistic; Crimea; Party of 
Regions.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Not long ago, the whole world was jolted by Moscow’s 
intention to annex Crimea, a Ukrainian territory where ethnic 
Russians make up some 60% of a population of 2 million with 
ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars accounting for the 
remainder. Among other causes of this problem is the perceived 
threat to the rights of Russian speakers throughout Ukraine and 
their right to use their native language. Language issues have 
been crucial in the history of Russian-Ukrainian relations and to 
a great extent have helped in forming the preconditions for 
Ukrainian nation-building. It is part of Russian foreign policy to 
promote Russian language in the Near Abroad (a term for the 
new states that were created after the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union).  Apart from this, the federal programme of 1996 on 
Russian language states that at the state level, it is necessary to 
ensure the support for Russian as a powerful social factor for the 
consolidation of the countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), as a stimulant for the realisation of the 
geopolitical interests of Russia (the Romyr Report, 2000). 
According to the 2001 national census of Ukraine, 78% of the 
population consists of Ukrainians, and most of them (85%) 
claim Ukrainian as their native language.  On the other hand, 
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about 50% of Ukrainian citizens declare Russian to be their 
language of convenience or language of daily communication. 
Both of the Ukrainian Law on Languages (1989) and the 
Ukrainian Constitution (1996) recognize Ukrainian as the sole 
state language while Russian is placed among other minority 
languages that can be legally used and protected by law 
alongside the state language.  Another index of Razumkov 
Centre states that in the early years of the 21st century, the 
number of ethnic Ukrainians who spoke Russian was 30% 
higher than the number of Ukrainian speakers.  However, today, 
60% of residents of Ukraine consider Ukrainian to be their 
native language. When translated into the language of everyday 
usage, 53.3% of the general population speaks Ukrainian, and 
44.5% Russian (2003-2004 State Statistics Committee of 
Ukraine). 
 
2. Historical Background of Ukrainian and Russian in 
    Ukraine 
Comparatively, Ukrainian language has fewer speakers than 
Russian language. The process of restructuring the modern 
Ukrainian literary language can be dated towards the end of the 
19th century, when the country was largely lacking 
independence, territorial unity, and was economically backward.  
At that time, the territories with Ukrainian population were 
divided among three countries, namely Russia, Hungary, and 
Austria; as such, there were three different laws regulating the 
Ukrainian language in these territories. According to Shevelon 
(1984:134), under Austrian rule, 13% of the Ukrainian 
population (mainly East Galychyna and Bukovina) enjoyed 
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relatively good condition for the Ukrainian language due to the 
rather liberal Austrian constitution of 1867, which allowed 
regional administration to use local languages in public life and 
schooling. However, Ukrainians were the minorities (belonging 
mainly to the lower classes) in the territories where they lived. 
Under Hungarian rule in Transcarpathia, the most backward of 
all Ukrainian territories, the Ukrainian language existed as a 
mixture of local rural dialects and had very little chance of 
developing under clear conditions of total marginalization. In 
the Russian Empire, where 85% of the Ukrainians lived, 
Ukrainian language rights were also strictly limited. 
In Galychyna, notwithstanding the restrictions imposed by 
Polish administration, Ukrainian primary schools were 
widespread, the Ukrainian press was well developed, and the 
language was used as a banner of national consolidation and 
liberation. In the Russian Empire, however, publication of 
books, journals and newspapers in Ukranian was restricted; 
theater performances were subjected to complicated regulations; 
schooling in Ukrainian was prohibited; and the language of the 
juridical system and local administration was Russian. Under 
these conditions, the Ukrainian language was virtually 
eliminated from all spheres of public life and was given the 
official status of a Russian dialect unsuitable for political and 
academic purpose (Shevelon 1987:68). The mentality of the 
inferior status of Ukrainian language was equally shared among 
Ukrainians.  Most of their intelligentsia considered it a mainly 
rural, poetic, and folkloric language and as a result supported the 
idea of bilingualism. As Zhurzhenko (2013:89) puts it, a limited 
vocabulary (particularly concerning scientific and technical 
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terminology) based on rural origins, regional differences and 
strong influence of local dialects, and underdeveloped and shaky 
grammar rules are straits that characterized Ukrainian at the 
beginning of the 20th century. She goes further to say that 
Ukrainian was the language of the peasants and of those very 
narrow strata of intelligentsia which came from the peasants and 
served their interests; priests, teachers, sometimes doctors. 
Capitalism in Ukraine speaks Russian. The bourgeoisie and the 
new technical intelligentsia were largely alienated from 
Ukrainian, which caused the lack, not only of state, but also of 
economic support for national cultural development. Their 
second-class rating of the Ukrainian language continued till 
almost the end of the Second World War when western 
territories were added to the Soviet Ukraine. 
This is a clear instance of application of critical approaches to 
language ideology which explore the capacity for language and 
linguistic ideologies to be used as strategies for maintaining 
social power and domination. Woolard and Schieffelin 
(1994:132) describe them as some aspects of representation and 
social cognition, with particular social origins or functional and 
formal characteristics. Government policies often reflect the 
tension between two contrasting types of language ideologies: 
ideologies that conceive of language as a resource, problem, or 
right (Richard 1984) and ideologies that conceive of language as 
pluralistic phenomena (Woolard 1998). 
Russian language is seen here in the perspective of standard 
language ideology which Lippi-Green (1997:214) defines as a 
bias toward an abstract, idealized homogeneous language, which 
is imposed and maintained by dominant institutions and which 
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has as its model the written language, but which is drawn 
primarily from the spoken language of the upper middle class. 
He goes further to say that part of this ideology is a belief that 
standard languages are internally consistent. 
 
3. Ukrainian in USSR Days 
The period prior to the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics in 1922, preceding to the collapse of the Russian 
Empire in 1917, marked an era of high political instability 
during which the regime changed several times and most of the 
territory was beyond the control of the central authorities. Even 
under the Soviet authority, only the western regions out of most 
of the Ukrainian territory remained under Poland. It was obvious 
that independent Ukrainian state could not be realized and the 
official policy turned again to some version of Russian-
Ukrainian bilingualism. Of course, the Soviet leadership 
advocated the idea of nation’s right to self-determination but 
this was hardly adhered to because of persistent internal and 
external threats to the new regime which seems to compel the 
need for centralization and control over the leadership in the 
Soviet republics. 
At that time, the Communist Party leaders in Ukraine were 
mainly Russians. While the working class spoke Russian, the 
memory of the war with the nationalist government fueled 
hostility toward the Ukrainian language despite the official 
internationalization. Although the Party’s Realpolitic was not to 
impede peasants from speaking Ukrainian, the start of 
industrialization, as a matter of fact, did strengthen the position 
of the Russian language in the cities (Zhurzhenko 2013: 68).  In 
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1923, however, the party leadership in Moscow initiated a new 
wave of Ukrainization which came into effect from 1925 to 
1932. Under the new policy, forceful measures were 
implemented to ensure the official status of the Ukrainian 
language; special courses for administrative officials were 
opened, schools and higher education system changed to 
Ukrainian, while linguists and philologists started the serious 
work of modernizing terminology and ordering grammar. This 
resulted to a marginal rise of modern Ukrainian arts and 
literature and a boost to Ukrainian culture. All these were in line 
with Soviet’s new policy in supporting anti-imperialist struggle 
in the colonial world. This trend, however, did not last long 
because of the total change of political climate associated with 
Stalinist terror of the early 1930s. Consequently, the 
Ukrainization campaign was stopped on orders from Moscow.  
As Shevelov (1987:143) puts it, party leaders responsible for it 
were dismissed or arrested (for instance, the leader of the 
Communist Party of Ukraine, Mykola Skrypnyk, committed 
suicide in 1933), and thousands of representatives of the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia were accused of bourgeois nationalism 
and thus repressed. The social basis of further Ukrainization was 
eventually eliminated by a deliberately organized famine among 
the rural population. Further repressions were meted out on the 
language after the Soviet war with Nazi Germany when some 
ethnic minorities, including Ukraine, were accused of being not 
loyal enough to Soviet power. Millions of Ukrainians were 
forcibly exiled to Siberia. Many who did not accept Soviet rule 
and tried to avoid political repression emigrated to the West. 
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Those that remained were seen as dissidents and more 
aggressive repressions were meted out to them. 
The death of Stalin ushered in a new democratization of 
public life and the end of the 1950s witnessed remarkable 
national cultural renaissance. A greater interest with more 
consciousness in the Ukrainian language and literature was 
introduced among the population by young poets, writers, and 
artists widely known as the Shestidesiatnikis or generation of the 
60s. Poetry readings, public lectures, and celebrations of cultural 
events attracted students and intelligentsia both in Eastern and 
Western Ukraine. The names of some Ukrainian writers and 
artists suppressed by Stalin’s regime were reincorporated into 
the Ukrainian culture as a consequence of those first democratic 
acts of re-remembering (Zhurzhenko, 2013:88). This new 
consciousness, however, did not continue without some controls 
by the so-called liberal and pro-Ukrainian party leadership, else 
Moscow’s attention could be drawn to it and possible sanctions 
and repressions introduced and reinvigorated. According to 
Lyudmila Alekseeva (1992:77), a historian of the dissident 
movement, the aim of the Shestidesiatriki was the 
democratization of the Soviet system and the suspension of 
justification, and they believed in the possibility of achieving 
this under the conditions of Soviet system. She argues that 
Lenin’s principles of nationalities politics in the USSR were 
distorted by Stalin and later Khrushchev, and the idea of a fusion 
of nations into a homogeneous soviet people and the treatment 
of national cultures (i.e. cultures of nationalities) as secondary 
cultures contradicts the very idea of communism. This position 
was not acceptable to the Party leadership. Consequently, arrests 
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of Ukrainian intelligentsia started in 1965 which succeeded in 
fuelling public solidarity for the national cause. Ethnic Russians 
were encouraged by the Society leadership to relocate to 
Ukrainian lands and supported Ukrainians moving to the eastern 
and northern territories of Russia. The outcome of this according 
to Romyr Report (2000) is that, by 1991, ethnic Russians 
composed 22.1% of the total population of Ukraine compared 
with 8.2% in 1926. 60% of them in 1991 were immigrants. By 
1987, 72% of the schools in Ukraine taught in Russian, 16% in 
Ukrainian, and 12% had a mixed curriculum. 
According to the Language Law On Languages in the 
Ukrainian SSR, Ukrainian received the status of a single state-
language in 1989. Article 10 of the new Ukrainian constitution 
confirmed this status in 1996 and conferred responsibility on the 
state to ensure universal development and functioning of the 
Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life on all territories 
of Ukraine.  As contained in the constitution, the people of 
Ukraine are divided into three categories: the titular nation 
(Ukrainians); the core nations; and the national minorities.  It 
should be noted that the Russian language which is still very 
influential in Ukraine, automatically gained secondary status, 
and a campaign to introduce the Ukrainian language into the 
educational system and state structures began. This 
unfortunately is yet to yield any positive result. It is remarkable 
that in the Eastern and Southern Ukraine (both historically 
Russian speaking), Ukrainization faced hidden resistance and, as 
such, was rather superficial and not very successful. As 
Ryabchuk (2012:104) puts it, both the Ukrainian Law on 
Languages (1989) and the Constitution (1996) recognize 
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Ukrainian as the sole state language whereas Russian is placed 
among other minority languages that can be legally used and 
protected by law alongside the state language. However, legal 
mechanisms to effectively enforce the use of the state language 
are yet to be elaborated.  
The language law has been applied arbitrarily, selectively, 
and in a highly opportunistic manner. The consequence of which 
is, according to the Romyer Report (2000), the percentage of 
Ukrainian language schools reached 75.5% and that of higher 
learning in Ukrainian 66% by the end of the 1998/1999 
academic year. During the same period, the percentage of 
newspapers printed in Ukrainian fell from 68% (1990) to 39.6% 
(1998), and the percentage of Ukrainian language magazines 
dropped from 90.4% to 11.5%. 
Another blow on the Ukrainization of Ukraine was the 
ratification of the European Charter of Minority Languages by 
the Ukrainian Parliament in December 1999.  According to the 
Charter, the Russian language can be considered as in fact 
having equal status with Ukrainian in the regions (i.e. 
administrative units) where the Russian-speaking community 
exceeds 20% of the population.  Currently, the total population 
of Ukraine which is about 50 million speaks mainly two 
languages: Ukrainian and Russian.  According to Golovaha and 
Panina (2000:141) in a recent sociological survey, the following 
statistics subsist. 
 
People consider as their native language: 
Ukrainian - 63.8% 
Russian  - 35.1% 
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Other languages - 1.2% 
 
But the language of communication in the family may differ 
from their native language: 
Ukrainian - 39.1% 
Russian - 36.0% 
Russian/ Ukrainian (depending on situation) - 24.8% 
Other languages  - 0.2% 
 
From this analysis, there is no gainsaying the fact that Ukraine is 
a bilingual country. The language split has two dimensions: a 
regional division between western and eastern Ukraine and a 
social division between the urban and rural populations. 
Ukrainian urban and industrial east has a high concentration of 
the country’s 11.4 million ethnic Russians (22.1% of the total 
population) and is predominantly Russian speaking. Almost 
70% of the Russian population lives in the five oblasts of 
Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Duipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhya. It 
is important to note that what differentiates Ukraine from other 
republics of the former USSR, especially the Baltic States is that 
Russian language is widespread and still dominant in culture, 
science, business, and other spheres (except, possibly, politics). 
The ruling political and administrative elite remains to a large 
extent Russian speaking and Ukrainian is used mainly for 
political purposes. As Zhurzhenko (2013:32) puts it, loyal to the 
state and not opposing its Ukrainization policy, the new middle 
class is ready to pay for their children’s education in Russian, 
which is still more prestigious and presumably of better quality 
(not to speak of the business elites who appear to be more 
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committed to English). Riabchyk (2011) quoting Hanna 
Herman, the deputy Head of the Omnipotent Presidential 
Administration, recognized that Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians 
are, in fact, second-rate citizens in Ukraine with a very weak 
social and economic position. In contrast to the dominant 
Russophones they are left with a structurally restrained ability to 
influence the political, economic, and cultural life of the 
country. Herman went further to say that 
 
Rich people are mostly Russian-speaking, while a great 
many citizens of Ukraine with Ukrainian mentality are 
poor people. This is the legacy of the first Ukrainian 
leaders. Whereas Vyacheslav Chornovil (a former 
political prisoner and one of the leaders of national-
democratic movement during perestroika and the early 
years of Ukrainian independence) led us to meetings, 
where we sang Chervona Kalyna (a patriotic song), the 
Komsomol functionaries have seized banks, privatized 
factories, and now they are wealthy, influential, and 
dictate fashion. 
http://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/1194816-german-
ukrayinomovni-gromadyani-ne-majut-
finansovogo.vplivu-v-krayini  
 
By this, Herman implies that the Ukrainophones are in a 
backward position not because of colonial legacy and particular 
policies of  Tsars and Commissars, and certainly not because of 
today’s policies of the present administration, but that 
Ukrainophones are socially handicapped, first and foremost, 
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because they sang patriotic songs with their gullible leaders and 
cared too much about national symbolism, while the former 
Soviet nomenklatura seized power and property and effectively 
transformed the political dominance of the Russophone Soviet 
elite into an economic one. 
 
4. Russian-speakers, Ukrainian-speakers and National  
    Identity in Ukraine 
Russian speakers believe and insist that they represent the 
interest of the highly developed eastern part of Ukraine, where 
the main industrial and scientific centers are located. They argue 
that limiting the scope of operation of the Russian language 
would lead to scientific, industrial and social backwardness.  
According to them, 80% of library materials are still in Russian, 
and the publications market is dominated by Russian books. 
Russian is still the language of international communication in 
the former USSR, and is one of the most spoken languages in 
the world. Therefore, limiting Russian cannot be considered a 
rational policy for the future of the Ukrainian nation. On the 
other hand, the Ukrainian speakers use the term Soviet as a label 
for Russian speakers as anti-national and anti-Ukrainian, and 
Russian-speakers are doomed to us ‘old-fashioned’ versions of 
Soviet history in order to construct their identity. Looking at the 
debate between liberals and communitarians in the 
contemporary situation in Ukraine, the main peculiarity of this 
situation is that there are three major linguistic groups based on 
two languages: Russian-speaking Russians, Ukrainian-speaking 
Ukrainians, and Russian-speaking Ukrainians (Wilson, 1997).  
Ukrainian nationalists usually interpret it in terms of 
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disadvantages of nation building.  According to Ryabchuk 
(2000:133), the weakest and vaguest sense of national identity is 
that of the Russophone Ukrainians who are rather Ukrainian in 
political terms, and rather ‘Russians’ in terms of culture.  Both 
Ukrainians and Russians compete for the support of this group, 
and both claim it to be their own.  On many levels, this 
competition looks like a civil cold war, with hardly predictable 
results. 
 
5. Ukraine New Language Law 
On July 3, 2011, the ruling party of Ukraine, the Party of 
Regions, submitted a draft law ‘on the fundamentals of the 
national language policy’ to the Ukrainian parliament for 
consideration and making it a law.  The law stipulates that any 
of the 18 ‘regional and minority’ languages spoken by 10 (or 
more per cent of the people in a certain administrative regions 
can be used in that region as the ‘official’ language alongside 
Ukrainian.  This by implication means that Russian would take 
an official status in 13 of Ukraine’s 27 designated regions, i.e. 
11 ‘oblasts’ (provinces) and the cities of Kiev and Sevastopol.  
In the far western area of Transcarpathia, Hungarian would gain 
official status.  In Chernivtsi and southwestern Odessa, the same 
would apply to Romanian and Bulgarian.  On the Crimean 
peninsula, the Tatar language would also gain such status.  
Altogether, Ukraine would have 18 ‘official languages’. 
Expectedly, the acceptance of this sparked spontaneous mixed 
reactions.  Some analysts maintain that the law would 
undermine the status of Ukrainian, which has been the only 
official language since the country gained independence in 
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1991.  They anticipate a deepening of a regional divide between 
the Ukrainian-speaking western regions, and the mainly 
Russophone areas of the south and east. This school of thought 
argues that the main goal of the language bill is not to protect 
Russian, which is the dominant language in most regions and 
areas, but to marginalize further and ultimately eliminate 
Ukrainian. To them, the language bill is designed not for 
Ukrainian citizens but for post-soviet bureaucrats who are 
increasingly tired of a de facto bilingualism, i.e. daily 
communication mostly in Russian but paperwork mostly in 
Ukrainian, and would like to move largely towards a more 
comfortable Russian mono-lingualism, under the so-called 
‘regional language.’ 
On the other hand, the law was lauded internationally as fully 
corresponding to Ukraine’s European operations and European 
obligations. The Associated Press opines that allowing or 
banning the use of Russian is one of the most divisive topics in 
post-Soviet Ukraine.  It announced that the dark age of 
persecution of all things Russian is drawing to an end; and 
readers can sigh with relief because the new law would allow the 
use of the Russian language in courts, hospitals, and other 
institutions in the Russian-speaking regions of the country.  
 
5. Historical Factor to the Language Problem 
Historically, the Eastern Ukraine fell under Russian imperial 
rule by the late 17th century, much earlier than Western Ukraine.  
This explains why, after the fall of the Soviet Union, people in 
the east continued to support more Russian-leaning politicians.  
On the other hand, western Ukraine spent centuries under the 
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shifting control of European powers like Poland and the Austro-
Hungarian Empire.   The western third of Ukraine was even part 
of Poland for several years leading up to World War II.  That 
explains why people in the west have tended to support more 
western leaning politicians.  The east tends to be more Russian-
speaking and Orthodox, with parts of the west more Ukrainian-
speaking and with heavier catholic influence. 
Again, it is important to note that under the reign of 
Catherine II, the steppe areas of eastern Ukraine became major 
economic centers of coal and iron. The Ukrainian language-
speaking in rural areas - was twice banned by decree of the Tsar.  
In explaining further why the sense of Ukrainian nationalism is 
not as deep in the east as in the west, it should be remembered 
that in the early 1930s, to force peasants into joining collective 
farms, Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin orchestrated a famine that 
resulted in the starvation and death of millions of Ukrainians. 
Afterward, he (Stalin) imported large members of Russians and 
other Soviet citizens, many with no ability to speak Ukrainian 
with other few ties to the region to help repopulate the east. 
 
6. Conclusion 
It can easily be concluded that the contemporary language 
politics in Ukraine can be analyzed as a field of political battle 
for the right to use a new political language: the language of 
democratic values and human rights. Language politics can be 
seen as fight for symbolic power, a competition of different 
interpretation of the key values of democracy. 
Evidently today, Ukraine is a bilingual country. Despite all 
the historical transformations, the changes of political system 
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and of state borders, despite significant progress made by the 
Ukrainian language and despite the efforts of twenty-three years 
of independence, the contemporary situation in a way 
reproduces the old pattern from the beginning of the 20th 
century.  There are two dimensions in the language split: a 
regional division between western and eastern Ukraine and a 
social division between the urban and rural populations. There 
is, however, no gainsaying the fact that ethnic Russians and 
ethnic Ukrainians in Ukraine basically understand each other. 
Language does not divide the residents of Ukraine. They believe 
that the role of the government in guiding language usage is at 
best ephemeral and that the progress of Ukraine towards a 
Ukrainophone environment continues the path that was started 
in the late 1980s, despite a relatively authoritarian and unhelpful 
regime in Kiev. It is obvious that the Russophone Ukrainians 
prefer today’s ambiguity, which de facto allows them to use 
only Russian in their work without any sanctions for ignoring or 
even deriding publicly the so-called state language. 
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